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COMMENTS
COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAWS VERSUS THE POWER OF CONGRESS
AS CONFERRED IN ARTICLE I, SECTION 8
By CARLOS J. BADGER
Member of the Modesto Bar
The Constitution of the United States provides in article I, section 8,
in part:
"The Congress shall have power to ... make rules for the govern-
ment and regulation of the land and naval forces.... To make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the fore-
going Powers ......
In the exercise of this power Congress passed the National Service Life
Insurance Act in 1940, chapter 757, title VI, part I, section 602-a, 54 Stats.
1009, 38 U. S. C. A. sec. 802, Appendix page iii. This act provided that the
serviceman who took out the insurance could designate the beneficiary from
certain stated classes of relatives (see infra).
It is well-established law in the community property states that the
proceeds of life insurance policies whose premiums are paid for with com-
munity funds are also community property. It is also well established in
California that the earnings of a serviceman who is married are community
property.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently decided the case
of Wissner v. Wissner (Feb. 1950), 70 S. Ct. 398, rehearing denied, 70
S. Ct. 619, involving the rights of a wife in the proceeds of a National Service
Life Insurance policy, the premiums of which were paid by her husband
from his army pay. The husband had named his mother the primary bene-
ficiary and his father contingent beneficiary. In an opinion by Mr. Justice
Clark, concurred in by Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Black, Reed and
Burton, it was held that the designation of the beneficiary by the assured takes
precedence over the wife's claimed community property interest in the
proceeds under California law. Mr. Justice Minton dissents and Justices
Frankfurter and Jackson join in the dissent on the ground that Congress did
not intend to give the serviceman the right to take his wife's property and
purchase a policy of insurance payable to his mother and thereby defraud
the wife of her community interest under state laws.
The District Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, speaking
through Justice Adams, had held that if Congress had intended to give the
serviceman the right to designate the beneficiary of such an insurance policy
and to make the payments to the beneficiary provided for by the act, free
from the claim of the wife under the California community property law
(66)
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that such an intent on the part of Congress would be unconstitutional and
in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The National Service Life Insurance Act involved in the case provided:
(Sections selected as relevant to the discussion herein and to show overall
character of the act) :
(a) Insurance shall be granted by the United States to persons on active
service.'
(b) A person who dies within 120 days of entering active service with-
out having insurance in effect in the amount of $5,000 shall be deemed to have
applied for and been granted insurance in the sum of $5,000, to be paid to
a restricted group of beneficiaries. 2
(e) Insurance shall be issued on the five-year level premium term plan
with privilege of conversion on any date of premium payment to relate back
to date of original issue.3
(f) "The insurance shall be payable only to a widow, widower, child
(including a stepchild or an illegitimate child if designated as beneficiary
by the insured), parent (including person in loco parentis if designated as
beneficiary by the insured), brother or sister of the insured. The insured
shall have the right to designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the insur-
ance, but only within the classes herein provided, and shall, subject to regu-
lations, at all times have the right to change the beneficiary or beneficiaries
of such insurance without the consent of such beneficiary or beneficiaries but
only within the classes herein provided."4
(h) If no beneficiary is designated or if the designated beneficiary does
not survive the insured payments shall be made to beneficiaries specified in
the act.5
(i) "The right of any beneficiary to payment of any installment shall
be conditioned upon his or her being alive to receive such payments." 6
(j) "No person shall have a vested right to any installment or install-
ments of any such insurance and any installments not paid to a beneficiary
during such beneficiary's lifetime shall be paid to the beneficiary ...
provided for in the act.
(k) "No installments shall be paid to the heirs or legal representatives
as such of the insured or of any beneficiary, and in the event that no person
within the permitted class survives to receive the insurance or any part
thereof no payment of the unpaid installments shall be made.
' 8
'National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940, Oct. 8, 1940, chap. 757, title VI, part I, se.
602(a) (54 Stat. 1009), 38 U. S. C. A. sec. 802(a).
254 Stat. 1009, 38 U. S. C. A. sec. 802(d) (2).
254 Stat. 1009 (38 U. S. C. A. sec. 802(f)).
'54 Stat. 1009 (38 U. S. C. A. sec. 802(g)).
554 Stat. 1009 (38 U. S. C. A. sec. 802 (i)).
'54 Stat. 1009 (38 U. S. C. A. sec. 802(i) ).
754 Stat. 1009 (38 U. S. C. A. sec. 802(i) ).
854 Stat. 1009 (38 U. S. C. A. sec. 802()).
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(m) The amount of the first premium may be advanced from current
appropriations for active service pay.
(n) Premiums may be waived during total disability.t0
(o) Sums necessary to carry out the provisions of the act are appropri-
ated from money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated."
(r) The United States shall bear the cost of administration.
12
(s) The United States shall pay costs of excess mortality and waiver
of premiums due to disability.
13
(t) The Administrator shall execute the provisions of the act, make
rules and decide all questions.' 4
(v) No State law providing for presumption of death shall be appli-
cable.15
(x) Payments of benefits due or to become due shall not be assignable.'6
(y) Payments made to, or on account of, a beneficiary:
(1) Shall be exempt from taxation.
(2) Shall be exempt from the claims of creditors.
(3) Shall not be liable to attachment, levy or seizure by or under
any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after
receipt by the beneficiary.
[All italics in the above sections supplied.-Ed.]
The majority of the court find that the act was intended by Congress
to afford a uniform and comprehensive system of life insurance for members
and veterans of the armed forces of the United States and states as follows:
"A liberal policy toward the serviceman and his named beneficiary is
everywhere evident in the comprehensive statutory plan. Premiums are very
low and are waived during the insured's disability; costs of administration
are borne by the United States; liabilities may be discharged out of con-
gressional appropriations.
"The controlling section of the act provides that the insured 'shall have
the right to designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the insurance
(within a designated class) . . .. and shall . . . at all times have the right
to change the beneficiary or beneficiaries . . .' 38 U. S. C. A. 80 2 (g). Thus
Congress has spoken with force and clarity in directing that the proceeds
belong to the named beneficiary and no other. Pursuant to the congressional
command, the Government contracted to pay the insurance to the insured's
choice. He chose his mother. It is plain to us that the judgment of the lower
954 Stat. 1009 (38 U. S. C. A. sec. 802(m) ).
1054 Stat. 1009 (38 U. S. C. A. sec. 802(n) .
1154 Stats. 1011 (38 U. S. C. A. sec. 804).
1254 Stat. 1012 (38 U. S. C. A. sec. 806), Appendix page xi.
154 Stat. 1012 (38 U. S. C. A. sec. 807(a) (b) (c) ), Appendix page xii.
1454 Stat. 1012 (38 U. S. C. A. sec. 808).
154 Stat. 1013 (38 U. S. C. A. sec. 810).
1 See. 3, 49 Stat. 609 (38 U. S. C. A. see. 454a).
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court, as to one-half of the proceeds, substitutes the widow for the mother,
who was the beneficiary Congress directed [should receive] the insurance
money. We do not share appellee's discovery of congressional purpose that
widows in community property states participate in the payments under the
policy, contrary to the express direction of the insured. Whether directed at
the very money received from the Government or an equivalent amount, the
judgment below nullifies the soldier's choice and frustrates the deliberate
purpose of Congress. It cannot stand."
The court does not discuss or refer to other cases construing the act
although there have been a large number. One of the leading cases on the
subject is White v. United States, 270 U. S. 175, 70 Law Ed. 530, where the
court, speaking through Justice Holmes, says:
"The insurance was a contract, to be sure, for which a premium was
paid, but it was not one entered into by the United States for gain. All
soldiers were given a right to it, and the relation of the government to them,
if not paternal, was at least avuncular. It was a relation of benevolence
established by the government at considerable cost to itself, for the soldier's
good. It was a new experiment in which changes might be found necessary,
or at least, as in this case, feasible more exactly to carry out his will. If the
soldier was willing to put himself into the government's hands to that extent
no one else could complain. The only relations of contract were between the
government and him. Whites mother's interest at his death was vested only
so far as he and the government had made it so, and was subject to any
conditions upon which they might agree."
In Von Der Lippi-Lipski v. U. S., 4 Fed. 2d 168, the court said:
"It has been held repeatedly that a beneficiary under such a contract of
insurance did not have a vested interest in installments of insurance not
accrued, and that such contract is not an ordinary contract of insurance, nor
is it in the nature of a pension, but is rather of the character and nature of
both. It has also been held that the authority of the insured, expressly con-
ferred by statute, to designate whomsoever he desired, within the permitted
class, as beneficiary under such contract of insurance was effective, when
exercised by the insured, as against those who would otherwise have been
entitled to benefits thereunder." (Italics ours.)
In Sizemore v. Sizemore's Guardian, 222 Ky. 713, 2 S. W. 2d 395,
the court said:
(2) "It is insisted upon this appeal that the amendment to the statute
after the death of the soldier violated the Fifth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States, in that it deprived appellant of her property without
due process of law. The argument proceeds upon the theory that the desig-
nated beneficiary had a vested right to all of the insurance, which could not
be affected by later legislation. The argument is unsound. The beneficiary
has no vested right in the installments not due or paid. His right to receive
further installments ended at the death of the beneficiary, and Congress
possessed the power to provide where the insurance money should go in
every contingency. The interest of the beneficiary was vested only so far
as the soldier and the government had made it so, and was subject to any
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conditions, upon which they might agree. Congress, in creating the right,
could annex conditions, and the beneficiary took the right subject to the
conditions. White v. U. S., 270 U. S. 175, 70 L. Ed. 530 annotated; Helmholz
v. Horst (C. C. A.), 294 F. 417; Cassarello v. U. S. (D. C.), 271 F. 486,
affirmed (C. C. A.) 279 F. 396; Gilman v. U. S. (D. C.), 300 F. 764, affirmed
(C. C. A.), 300 F. 767; Sutton's Ex'r. v. Barr's Adm'r, 219 Ky. 543,
293 S. W. 1075." (Italics ours.)
The following cases contain express statements to the same effect:
Bradley v. United States (1944; C. C. A. 10th Okla.), 143 F. 2d 573 (cert.
den. 1945, 323 U. S. 793, 89 L. Ed. 632) ;
Woods v. United States (1947; D. C. Ala.), 69 Fed. Supp. 760;
Lincoln Bank & T. Co. v. United States (1947; D. C. Ky.), 71 Fed. Supp.
745;
Dodd v. United States (1948; D. C. Ark.), 76 Fed. Supp. 991;
Citron v. United States (1947; D. C. Dist. Col.), 69 Fed. Supp. 830;
Owens v. Owens (Ky., 1947), 204 S. W. 2d 580.
In the case of Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571, the court, speaking
through Justice Brandeis, held that the 1933 economy act which repealed
laws relating to veterans' insurance deprived a veteran of vested rights and
was therefore in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
of the United States Constitution.
The Lynch case has been cited with approval in United States v. Zazove,
334 U. S. 602, 92 Law Ed. 601.
The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution provides that
an act of Congress is the supreme law of the land and will take precedence
over state rules of law to the contrary. This is subject, of course, to the
proviso that the act of Congress itself must be constitutional, e. g., the Lynch
case.
In the Wissner case the wife claimed to have a vested right in her
husband's earnings under the community property laws of the State of Cali-
fornia. The first attack which could be made upon this claimed vested right
is the attack made because of the nature of the husband's earnings. The
Supreme Court of the State of California in the case of French v. French,
17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P. 2d 235, has held that the earnings of a member of
the armed forces are community property. The Supreme Court of the United
States, in considering the rights of members of the armed forces to their
pay in United States v. Williams, 302 U. S. 46, has held that the enlistment
of a minor in the army emancipates him from the state laws, which made
his earnings the property of his parents and gave him full control of these
earnings. The court said:
"Enlistment is more than a contract; it effects a change of status. It
operates to emancipate minors at least to the extent that by enlistment they
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become bound to serve subject to rules governing enlisted men and entitled
to have and freely to dispose of their pay. Upon enlistment of plaintiff's son
and until his death he became entirely subject to the control of the United
States in respect of all things pertaining to or effecting his service."
The Supreme Court expressly refused to pass on this question in the
Wissner case.
The next hurdle which the wife would have to get over in order to be
entitled to recover under the California community property law is the
provision in the federal act that "No person shall have a vested right to any
installment or installments of any such insurance." Assuming that the Cali-
fornia courts are correct and that the contract of marriage makes the earnings
of the husband thereafter community property and that the pay received
from the United States government is community property, can congressional
enactment under the powers granted to the Congress in act -1, section 8,
deprive a wife of her vested interest? This matter has been considered by
the Supreme Court in a number of cases and the court has uniformly held
that contracts between private individuals cannot create vested rights which
will be protected under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. See,
for example, Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467,
at page 485, where the court said:
"We forebear any further citation of authorities. They are numerous
and are all one way. They support the view that, as the contract in question
would have been illegal if made after the passage of the commerce act, it
cannot now be enforced against the railroad company, even though valid
when made. If that principle be not sound, the result would be that indi-
viduals and corporations could, by contracts between themselves, in antici-
pation of . . . legislation, render of no avail the exercise by Congress,
to the full extent authorized by the Constitution, of its power to regulate
commerce. No power of Congress can be thus restricted. The mischiefs that
would result from a different interpretation of the Constitution will be
readily perceived."
The wife then attempted to claim that while the federal government
could undoubtedly control the property incidents in moneys delivered to it
by the soldier and that the federal rules applied up to the time that the
proceeds of the insurance policy were paid to her ex-husband's parents, that
the federal government had no control over the proceeds after receipt by the
parents and she was met with the exemption statute contained in the act of
August 12, 1935, chapter 510, section 3 of 49 Statutes 609, 38 U. S. C. A.
section 454a, -which provides:
"Payments of benefits due or to become due shall not be assignable, and
such payments made to, or on account of, a beneficiary under any of the
laws relating to veterans shall be exempt from taxation, shall be exempt from
the claims of creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy or seizure
. 71
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by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after
receipt by the beneficiary . .."
The provisions of this section against assignments have been upheld in
Robertson v. McSpadden, 46 Fed. 2d 702; Bradley v. United States, 43 Fed.
2d 573; Von Der Lippi-Lipski v. United States, 4 Fed. 2d 168; Lewis v.
United States, 56 Fed. 2d 563; Murphy v. United States, 5 Fed. Supp. 583;
United States v. Sterling, 12 Fed. 2d 921; Tompkins v. Tompkins, 132
N. J. L. 217,38 Atl. 2d 890; Kauffman v. Kauffman, 93 Adv. Cal. App. 966.
The provisions of this section exempting the proceeds from taxation
were upheld in Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U. S. 245, and considered not
applicable to the situation presented in United States Trust Co. of New York
v. Helvering, 307 U. S. 57.
The exemption from the claims of creditors was followed in Culp v.
Webster, 25 Cal. App. 2d 759, 70 P. 2d 273. In Pagel v. Pagel, 291 U. S.
473, it was held under the previous wording of this section that this exemp-
tion did not extend to the funds after they became a part of the estate of the
assured and the Congress immediately thereafter broadened the language
to cover that situation. In re McCormick's Estate, 8 N. Y. S. 2d 179, 185-188;
Haley v. United States, 46 F. Supp. 4, 7.
The widow attempted to overcome the force of these cases by relying
upon alimony cases and cases involving support for minor children. See
for example Schlaefer v. Schlaefer (1940), 71 D. C. App. 350, 112 F. 2d
177; Tully v. Tully (Mass., 1893), 34 N. E. 79; Hodson v. New York City
Employees' Retirement System (1935), 243 App. Div. 480, 278 N. W. Supp.
16; In re Guardianship of Bagnall (Iowa, 1947), 29 N. W. 2d 597, and cases
therein cited. There are, however, cases to the contrary, see for example
Brewer v. Brewer, 19 Tenn. App. 209, 84 S. W. 2d 1022; Maddox v. Elliott,
248 Ala. 271,27 So. 2d 498,499; Riker v. Riker, 160 Misc. 117, 289 N. Y. S.
835, decided under the similar wording of the act of January 27, 1936,
chapter 32, section 4, 49 Statute 1101 (38 U. S. C. A. 686c).
The Supreme Court in the Wissner case refused to resolve this conflict
although admitting that there were support aspects to the community prop-
erty principle. While the Supreme Court expressly refuses to resolve the
conflict in the alimony and support money cases, the logical effect of its
decision is to reaffirm the supremacy of an act of Congress passed pursuant
to expressly delegated powers which conflict with state rules of law even
though the state rules of law are in the field of so-called family law.
